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Abstract 
 
High-bandwidth covert channels pose significant risks to sensitive and proprietary information 
inside company networks. Domain Name System (DNS) tunnels provide a means to covertly 
infiltrate and exfiltrate large amounts of information passed network boundaries. This paper 
explores the possibility of detecting DNS tunnels by analyzing the unigram, bigram, and trigram 
character frequencies of domains in DNS queries and responses. It is empirically shown how 
domains follow Zipf's law in a similar pattern to natural languages, whereas tunneled traffic has 
more evenly distributed character frequencies. This approach allows tunnels to be detected across 
multiple domains, whereas previous methods typically concentrate on monitoring point to point 
systems. Anomalies are quickly discovered when tunneled traffic is compared to the character 
frequency fingerprint of legitimate domain traffic. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
A common method of bypassing firewall restrictions is to tunnel restricted protocols inside 
legitimate protocols, encapsulating the blocked traffic and effectively hiding it from the firewall and 
network intrusion detection systems. Policy-restricted application layer protocols (ALP) can be 
transported inside HTTP or DNS traffic, defeating protocol-based traffic restrictions at network 
boundaries. Ozyman, TCP-over-DNS, Iodine, Dns2tcp, DNScat, and DeNiSe are a few of the many 
DNS tunneling applications available on the internet. While many methods have been proposed for 
detecting DNS tunnels, there are still no available tools that effectively prevent their infiltration and 
exfiltration capabilities. 
 
DNS is a transactional protocol  responsible for resolving domain names to IP addresses. Fully 
Qualified Domain Names (FQDN) are formed as a series of labels separated by periods. These 
labels break the domain into hierarchical subdomains where each subdomain is controlled by the 
next higher-level domain to the right. RFC 1035 (Mockapetris 1987) specifies that labels must be 
63 octets or less, and the full domain must be 255 octets or less. The allowable characters are listed 
as a-Z, 0-9, and dashes.  The top level domain (TLD) refers to the label furthest right in the domain 
name, while the  Lowest Level Domain (LLD) refers to the label furthest left. 
 
DNS is an ideal candidate for covert channels because it is poorly monitored and typically must be 
allowed passed network boundaries. Since DNS is transactional, it also provides sufficient 
capabilities for command and control channels into a protected network. However, DNS resolvers 
will often cache responses from a previously queried domain. This can be defeated by uniquely 
encoding exfiltrated data in the LLD, requiring the new domain to be resolved. When the query is 
received at the nameserver of an upper-level domain, it can decode the LLD and obtain the 
embedded data. The server is then free to send further commands or acknowledgements as a 
response to the query. 
 
 
 Related Work 
 
Many statistical approaches for detecting tunnels have been proposed that look at the captured flows 
of the traffic. Web Tap (Borders 2004) detects anomalies by looking at HTTP request regularity, 
inter-request delay, bandwidth usage, and transaction size. Tunnel Hunter (Crotti et al. 2007)  
approaches the problem from the IP layer by finding inconsistencies in inter-arrival time, order, and 
size of the packets. Focusing on a lower-layer protocol allows the tool to be applied more broadly 
against other types of tunnels. Crotti (Crotti et al. 2008) and Dusi (Dusi 2008) used Tunnel Hunter 
to fingerprint protocols and applications that were tunneled inside encrypted traffic. Despite being 
encrypted in SSH, the authors were able to fingerprint different protocol tunnels by analyzing their 
behavior at the IP layer. Although the above methods had significant success, a tunnel that mimics 
the pattern of legitimate traffic would deter these detection strategies. 
 
Detecting DNS tunnels using anomaly detection to flag suspicious traffic was recently explored in 
the development of a tool known as DnsTrap (Hind 2009). In this tool, five attributes are used to 
train an Artificial Neural Network (ANN) to detect tunnels: the domain name, how many packets 
are sent to a particular domain, the average length of packets to that domain, the average number of 
distinct characters in the LLD, and the distance between LLD's. While the metrics chosen show 
promise, the use of neural networks is suspect and must be approached with caution because of their 
black -box nature and tendency to fall victim to generalization or over-fitting. 
 
Many tools are available that collect DNS statistics and provide visualizations and analysis of the 
data. Two popular tools for DNS analysis are  Dnstop (Dnstop 2009) and Dsc (Dsc 2009) . Dnstop 
builds display tables of common DNS statistics that could be of interest for both debugging and 
cyber security. Dsc, on the other hand, presents the user with various graphs that can be used to 
quickly analyze trends over time. Visualizing DNS traffic was examined deeper in (Ren et al. 2006), 
where the visual metaphor "Flying Term" was introduced. Several interesting visual representations 
of DNS traffic were given that rely on a human's spatial reasoning ability to quickly find anomalies 
that may be more difficult for a computer to detect. DNS analysis and visualization is also further 
explored in (Plonka and Barford 2008) using TreeTop. This tool classifies traffic based on context-
aware clustering, differentiating between canonical, overloaded, and unwanted DNS queries. All of 
these works primarily focus on attacks against DNS, whereas the focus of this paper is on tunnels 
encapsulated in DNS. While many of the same strategies and themes could apply, these techniques 
have not been deeply explored for the purpose of DNS tunnel detection. 
 
 
Character Frequency Analysis 
 
Character frequency analysis has been used many times when studying natural language. Initially 
examined by Zipf (Zipf 1932) and later by Shannon (Shannon 1951), it was shown that English has 
a distribution of characters that greatly affects the entropy (randomness) of the language. Patterns 
were found that made it easier to predict what the following bits of information would be as more 
information was collected. Since then, it has been used in several areas such as such as authorship 
identification and behavioral profiling. For example, Orebaugh (Orebaugh 2006) used character 
frequency analysis to profile users over instant messaging sessions. These profiles were then used to 
detect anomalous user activity. 
 
Most forms of natural language have been shown to be biased toward certain characters and 
patterns. English, for example, is characterized by a disproportionately large number of characters 
from the popularized nonsense phrase ETAOIN SHRDLU (Relative frequencies of letters 2009). 
This phrase represents, from greatest to least, the order of frequencies of the most popular 
characters in the English language. 
 
George Zipf (Zipf 1932) observed that the frequency of any word is inversely proportional to its 
rank in the frequency table (Zipf's Law). More specifically, a Zipfian distribution observes that the 
frequency of occurence of some event (P), as a function of  rank (i), when the rank is determined by 
the frequency of occurence, is the power-law function Pi ~ 1/i
a  
with the exponent a close to unity 
(Zipf's Law 2009). 
 
While the Zipfian distribution is typically applied to natural languages, this work applies the 
concept to unigrams, bigrams, and trigrams in domain names. The motivation for this approach is 
that domain names should also have fingerprintable n-gram frequencies. While not all domain 
names are formed from the English language, nearly all natural languages have been shown to 
follow a Zipfian distribution, reducing their entropy. The most effective tunnels will compress, 
encrypt, then encode the data sent through the LLD of DNS queries. One measurement of a good 
encryption algorithm is how random the output of the encryption function appears (the greater the 
entropy, the harder it is to predict values from given ciphertext). My work attempts to exploit this 
property by showing how data embedded in the LLD of domains would not follow a Zipfian 
distribution similar to what is found in typical LLDs. 
 
Empirical Studies 
 
Initial assumptions were first verified by comparing n-gram character frequencies in domains with 
their counterparts in the English language. This would determine whether domains had similar 
character patterns despite many domain names coming from a global pool of domains. The first test 
uses the 1,000,000 most popular domains (Top Sites 2009) with the LLDs and TLDs removed.  
These results are compared to the English language n-gram character frequencies provided in 
(Relative frequencies of letters 2009). 
 
Below, figures 1a, 1b, and 1c compare the unigram, bigram, and trigram character frequencies to 
their English counterparts: 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1a: Comparison of English and domain unigram character frequencies 
 
English Unigrams Domain Unigrams
LETTER FREQUENCY LETTER FREQUENCY
e 0.12702 e 0.10139
t 0.09056 a 0.08935
a 0.08167 i 0.07346
o 0.07507 o 0.07105
i 0.06966 s 0.06804
n 0.06749 r 0.06524
s 0.06327 t 0.06263
h 0.06094 n 0.06094
r 0.05987 l 0.04849
d 0.04253 c 0.03861
l 0.04025 m 0.03249
c 0.02758 d 0.03247
u 0.02758 u 0.03105
m 0.02406 p 0.02689
 Figure 1b: Comparison of English and domain bigram character frequencies 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1c: Comparison of English and domain trigram character frequencies 
 
The first observation is that the unigram ranks in English have a very similar rank correlation to the 
unigram ranks of  domains. Also, the changes in frequencies from one rank to the next are 
consistent between the two sets of data. For English, there was an average change in frequency 
between ranks of 0.059 per rank, while there was an average change of frequency of .057 per rank 
for domains. The biggest anomaly in the domain character ranks was the lack of the character 'h'. 
This letter is found often in English from words such as  'the', 'his', 'her', 'he', and 'she', which won't 
appear often in domain names. 
 
While bigrams and trigrams did not match as well as unigrams, it must be taken into consideration 
that there is an exponentially growing pool of items in these cases. When the data is normalized 
over the size of the n-gram pool, digrams and trigrams actually show significant patterns. Similar to 
unigrams, “the” can be seen as an anomaly in bigrams and trigrams in domain names. Although 
change in frequency from one rank to the next was more significant in English at the bigram and 
trigram level, a consistent drop in frequency is still present for domains. 
 
The following two graphs depict the similarities between English and domains when looking only 
at the change in frequency from one ranking to the next: 
English Bigrams Domain Bigrams
LETTER FREQUENCY LETTER FREQUENCY
th 0.03883 in 0.01702
he 0.03681 er 0.01550
in 0.02284 an 0.01333
er 0.02178 re 0.01290
an 0.02141 es 0.01271
re 0.01749 ar 0.01188
 nd 0.01572 on 0.01135
on 0.01418 or 0.01051
en 0.01383 te 0.01017
at 0.01336 al 0.00976
ou 0.01286 st 0.00921
ed 0.01276 ne 0.00921
ha 0.01275 en 0.00897
English Trigrams Domain Trigrams
LETTER FREQUENCY LETTER FREQUENCY
the 0.03508 ing 0.00498
and 0.01593 ion 0.00327
ing 0.01147 ine 0.00314
her 0.00822 ter 0.00314
hat 0.00651 lin 0.00306
his 0.00597 ent 0.00286
tha 0.00594 the 0.00285
ere 0.00561 ers 0.00258
for 0.00555 and 0.00240
ent 0.00531 est 0.00220
ion 0.00507 tio 0.00218
ter 0.00461 tra 0.00218
was 0.00461 tor 0.00212
you 0.00437 art 0.00204
  
Figure 2: English and domain n-gram frequencies by rank 
 
 
While the unigram drop in frequency appears much more pronounced than the others, it must be 
recognized that the frequency drop for bigrams and trigrams are distributed over an exponentially 
growing number of n-grams. Looking at the Zipfian dsitributionof n-gram frequencies appears to 
provide sufficient evidence for “language” regardless of the actual character rankings. 
 
However, claims have been made that a Zipfian distribution is seen in many systems that are fed 
random data, explaining why it is seen in nearly all natural languages. Therefore, the next test 
compared the previous data with 1,000,000 new domain names, each composed of ten randomly 
generated characters. This test also served to mimic encrypted data in a tunnel, which should appear 
random if proper encryption was used. Below, the unigram ranks and frequencies of randomly 
generating domain names are shown next to the unigram frequencies of popular domain names: 
 
 
Figure 3: Random domain unigram character frequencies for 1,000,000 domains 
 
Both unigram character ranks and the change in frequency from one rank to the next provide very 
strong evidence that character frequency analysis is a viable method of tunnel detection. Figure 3 
above shows minimal correlation between the character ranks, and the change in frequency for 
random domains is only 1/20th of the change in frequency for popular domains. 
 
 
Random Domains Domain Unigrams
LETTER FREQUENCY LETTER FREQUENCY
i 0.02722 e 0.10139
9 0.02715 a 0.08935
z 0.02710 i 0.07346
c 0.02710 o 0.07105
f 0.02709 s 0.06804
6 0.02708 r 0.06524
o 0.02707 t 0.06263
k 0.02707 n 0.06094
q 0.02707 l 0.04849
j 0.02706 c 0.03861
3 0.02705 m 0.03249
7 0.02705 d 0.03247
0 0.02704 u 0.03105
5 0.02406 p 0.02689
For the above tests, a large amount of data was used to ensure accurate statistics. However, in an 
actual network, significantly less data can be used for the detection of tunnels. Without a large 
amount of data, it is possible that the the character ranks and frequency would be significantly 
skewed toward outliers in the data. Therefore, several of the previous tests were performed using 
only one hundred domains. Below, the results are compared to the previous results that used one 
million domains: 
 
 
Figure 4: Unigram and bigram ranks and frequencies of 100 domains compared to 1,000,000 domains 
 
 
The results of the comparisons were very promising. Despite only using 100 domains, the n-gram 
character ranks and frequencies matched very well. The data collected over 100 domains had an 
average change of frequency of .055 per rank, comparing well with the .057 change in frequency 
for 1,000,000 domains.  This approach was then used to compare 100 randomly generated domains 
with 1,000,000 popular domains: 
 
 
Figure 5: Unigram ranks and frequencies of 100 random domains compared to 1,000,000 popular domains 
 
The unigram rank and frequencies of the random domains had minimal correlation with popular 
domains. An observation worth noting is that frequencies between ranks was more slightly more 
pronounced for 100 randoms domains then for 1,000,000 random domains. For 1,000,000 random 
domains, there was only a total difference in frequency of 0.00015 between the 1
st
 and 10
th
 ranked 
characters, while 100 random domains had a change in frequency of .0090  for the same ranks. This 
was due to outliers having a greater ability to skew the results when there is less data available. 
However, the change in frequency was still far less pronounced than the popular domain names, 
which had a total difference in frequency of .0628 between the 1
st
 and 10
th
 ranking characters. The 
Zipfian distribution of domain unigrams is shown below: 
 1 Mil. Domain Bigrams
LETTER FREQUENCY LETTER FREQUENCY
in 0.02048 in 0.01702
er 0.01707 er 0.01550
li 0.01707 an 0.01333
re 0.01707 re 0.01290
ed 0.01536 es 0.01271
le 0.01536 ar 0.01188
ou 0.01536 on 0.01135
ar 0.01195 or 0.01051
es 0.01195 te 0.01017
me 0.01195 al 0.00976
or 0.01195 st 0.00921
so 0.01195 ne 0.00921
ba 0.01024 en 0.00897
di 0.01024 ra 0.00875
100 Domain Bigrams1 Mil. Domain Unigrams
LETTER FREQUENCY LETTER FREQUENCY
e 0.10496 e 0.10139
o 0.08455 a 0.08935
i 0.08163 i 0.07346
a 0.07872 o 0.07105
r 0.05977 s 0.06804
n 0.05831 r 0.06524
t 0.05831 t 0.06263
s 0.04956 n 0.06094
d 0.04665 l 0.04849
l 0.04373 c 0.03861
u 0.03644 m 0.03249
b 0.03207 d 0.03247
c 0.03207 u 0.03105
g 0.03061 p 0.02689
100 Domain Unigrams
Random Domains Domain Unigrams
LETTER FREQUENCY LETTER FREQUENCY
2 0.03800 e 0.10139
y 0.03500 a 0.08935
7 0.03400 i 0.07346
q 0.03400 o 0.07105
4 0.03400 s 0.06804
w 0.03400 r 0.06524
5 0.03300 t 0.06263
8 0.03100 n 0.06094
p 0.03000 l 0.04849
- 0.02900 c 0.03861
9 0.02900 m 0.03249
m 0.02900 d 0.03247
v 0.02900 u 0.03105
x 0.02800 p 0.02689
 
Figure 6: Domain vs random domain unigram frequencies by rank 
 
With only 100 domains, both popular domains and randomly generated domains match very closely 
with the data from larger pools. It can also be seen that random domains will follow a Zipfian 
distribution less and less as the data set size increases. In contrast, popular domains will follow a 
Zipfian distribution more closely as the number of analyzed domains increases. 
 
When analyzing DNS requests for tunnels, it becomes critical to concentrate on subdomains. To 
verify the validity of the approach for subdomains, unigram frequencies were once again calculated 
after stripping away the TLD and following label.  Approximately 5000 DNS queries for 
subdomains were captured with Wireshark by creating a web crawler that visited sites from the 
previously used list of popular websites. The web crawler was allowed to span hosts, providing the 
most accurate depiction of traffic that would be seen from users surfing the internet in a networked 
environment. To obtain subdomains and nameservers queried by the ISP, a DNS response parser 
was created that could grab domains from all areas of the response, instead of simply relying on the 
DNS queries. Below, both subdomains and name server hosts are compared to the earlier formed  
fingerprint for domains: 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Unigram ranks and frequencies of subdomains and name server hosts compared to popular domains 
Subdomains Domain Unigrams
LETTER FREQUENCY LETTER FREQUENCY
a 0.08105 e 0.10139
s 0.08074 a 0.08935
e 0.06946 i 0.07346
o 0.06738 o 0.07105
n 0.06463 s 0.06804
. 0.05910 r 0.06524
i 0.05713 t 0.06263
c 0.04961 n 0.06094
t 0.04305 l 0.04849
l 0.04156 c 0.03861
m 0.03972 m 0.03249
r 0.03643 d 0.03247
g 0.03284 u 0.03105
d 0.02883 p 0.02689
NS Subdomains Domain Unigrams
LETTER FREQUENCY LETTER FREQUENCY
 n 0.20976 e 0.10139
s 0.19126 a 0.08935
1 0.06023 i 0.07346
2 0.06023 o 0.07105
d 0.04773 s 0.06804
. 0.04491 r 0.06524
0 0.03170 t 0.06263
3 0.02959 n 0.06094
c 0.02501 l 0.04849
a 0.02096 c 0.03861
g 0.02043 m 0.03249
4 0.02043 d 0.03247
e 0.01955 u 0.03105
t 0.01885 p 0.02689
 Subdomains are shown above to be very similar to domains in both character rank and frequency. It 
is interesting to note the increase in rank of the characters 'n' and 's'. This becomes more obvious 
when one looks strictly at the character frequency of name server hosts queried while the web 
crawler visited the domains. The subdomains from name servers are skewed by a heavy use of 
"ns#" patterns for name server hosts for domains such as "ns1.domain.com" and "ns2.domain.com". 
 
While name server hosts do not match as strongly as other subdomains, it can be quickly seen that 
they have their own unique fingerprint that can be used for frequency analysis. While name server 
subdomains differ from typical subdomains, it is clearly seen that they still follow a fingerprintable 
pattern that can be used for comparisons. Below, a Zipfian distribution can be seen in subdomains 
(with a noticeable anomaly for the 'n' and 's' in name server subdomains): 
 
 
Figure 9: Subdomain unigram frequencies by rank 
 
To verify the legitimacy of character frequency analysis, the above approach was used to collect 
statistics on several popular DNS tunnels. Sample traffic from Iodine, Dns2tcp, and TCP-Over-DNS 
was collected. In order to simulate data being exfiltrated from a network, all three programs were 
used to tunnel an SCP session of a pdf file from one host to another. One-hundred consecutive DNS 
queries were analyzed for each tunnel. Below, the character ranks and frequencies are compared to 
the results provided earlier for subdomains: 
 
 
Figure 10a: Unigram ranks and frequencies of 100 Iodine packets compared to subdomains 
 
Iodine Subdomains
LETTER FREQUENCY LETTER FREQUENCY
a 0.04969 a 0.08105
c 0.03360 s 0.08074
s 0.03329 e 0.06946
b 0.03217 o 0.06738
q 0.03186 n 0.06463
l 0.03177 . 0.05910
o 0.03132 i 0.05713
n 0.03119 c 0.04961
m 0.03096 t 0.04305
t 0.03038 l 0.04156
w 0.03033 m 0.03972
f 0.03020 r 0.03643
r 0.03020 g 0.03284
g 0.03006 d 0.02883
  
 
 
Figure 10b: Unigram ranks and frequencies of 100 Dns2tcp packets compared to subdomains 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10c: Unigram ranks and frequencies of 100 TCP-Over-DNS packets compared to subdomains 
 
 
 
When looking at character ranks, all three tunnels managed to match subdomains significantly 
better than the randomly generated domains from before, but still fell below the consistency seen in 
legitimate traffic. Most of the tunnels used base64 encoding while the randomly generated domains 
only used 37 characters (no upper-cased letters)  at maximum entropy (randomness). Since these 
tunnels used both lowercase and uppercase letters to increase entropy (but were counted equally for 
the totals above), the "number" characters fell to lower ranks in the tunnels.  
 
While the character ranks did not prove as useful in this case, the change in frequency between 
ranks was very telling. Below, the change in character frequency in subdomains is contrasted with 
the change in character frequency in the three tunnels: 
 
Dns2tcp Subdomains
LETTER FREQUENCY LETTER FREQUENCY
n 0.04515 a 0.08105
k 0.03794 s 0.08074
c 0.03770 e 0.06946
r 0.03569 o 0.06738
b 0,03470 n 0.06463
u 0.03137 . 0.05910
t 0.03121 i 0.05713
d 0.03105 c 0.04961
m 0.03097 t 0.04305
s 0.03097 l 0.04156
x 0.03097 m 0.03972
p 0.03080 r 0.03643
a 0.03048 g 0.03284
o 0.02918 d 0.02883
TCP-Over-DNS Subdomains
LETTER FREQUENCY LETTER FREQUENCY
k 0.04177 a 0.08105
g 0.04021 s 0.08074
b 0.03731 e 0.06946
j 0.03726 o 0.06738
m 0.03531 n 0.06463
o 0.03497 . 0.05910
d 0.03475 i 0.05713
e 0.03462 c 0.04961
c 0.03414 t 0.04305
v 0.03406 l 0.04156
n 0.03401 m 0.03972
q 0.03393 r 0.03643
a 0.03358 g 0.03284
l 0.03358 d 0.02883
 
Figure 11: Tunnel unigram frequencies by rank  for 100 queries vs subdomains 
 
 
The above graph shows a clear delineation between legitimate traffic and tunneled data. While 
many of the tunnels have a significantly increased frequency in the first two ranks, the rest of the 
ranks match closely with the randomly generated domains from before. The increased frequency in 
the first two ranks can be attributed to session id's and counters that had little change from one DNS 
request to the next. 
 
 
Conclusions and Future Work 
 
It has been empirically shown how DNS tunnels may be detected by analyzing the character 
frequencies of DNS queries and responses. Both domains and subdomains were shown to match the 
Zipfian distribution found in the English language. Fingerprints were developed for domains, 
subdomains, and name server hosts that can be used for detecting anomalous traffic being tunneled 
through DNS. This method may be used to detect tunnels that span multiple domains instead of 
focusing on point to point systems. 
 
Future work will involve building a tool that combines visualization and quantitative analysis for 
DNS tunnel detection. Empirical studies with this tool will provide sufficient data for creating a 
program for real-time DNS traffic monitoring and analysis. Character frequency analysis will be 
combined with multiple forms of tunnel detection to significantly reduce the effective bandwidth of 
covert channels. Future work will also determine the amount of padding necessary to mitigate 
detection through character frequency analysis. 
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